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Whistleblowing Speech and the First Amendment 
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.* 
Alexander Meiklejohn, the iconic First Amendment scholar who expounded the 
democratic self-government theory of the freedom of speech, posited that for demo-
cratic self-government to function, the voters themselves must possess the infor-
mation necessary to hold the government accountable. Yet, the information neces-
sary for the citizenry to render wise electoral verdicts not uncommonly belongs to 
the government itself, and government officials often prove highly reluctant to share 
information that reflects badly on them and their work. The lack of critically im-
portant information about the government’s performance makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for voters to hold government accountable on Election Day. To date, the 
federal courts have failed to recognize the crucial role that government employees 
often play in providing voters with the information necessary to make wise electoral 
decisions. The Connick/Pickering doctrine conveys only modest protection on gov-
ernment employees who engage in whistleblowing speech. Moreover, this doctrine 
fails to take into account directly the value and importance of whistleblowing speech 
to voters. This Article calls for the recognition of a new subcategory of government 
employee speech, whistleblowing speech, and proposes more rigorous First 
Amendment protection for such speech. Simply put, contemporary First Amendment 
theory and practice fails to provide sufficient protection to government employees 
who engage in whistleblowing speech that calls the body politic’s attention to wrong-
doing, corruption, and malfeasance within government agencies. If we want govern-
ment employees to speak, rather than remain silent, stronger constitutional medicine 
than Connick/Pickering will be required. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Democratic self-government relies on regular elections to ensure that government 
remains accountable and responsible to the body politic. However, for elections to 
serve as a means of securing government accountability, the voters must have access 
to relevant information about the successes—and failures—of those who currently 
hold office.1 Without information, the electoral process cannot serve as an effective 
means of ensuring government accountability for both its actions and its failures to 
act.2 This holds true as a general matter, but holds doubly true in a period when the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. But see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1819, 
1830–34 (2012) (arguing that the Roberts Court appears “deeply suspicious of the claim that 
the media play a special constitutional role in our democracy,” bordering on outright “hostil-
ity,” and positing that the conservative majority “treats the differences between media and 
non-media corporations as nonexistent”). 
 2. For an excellent and comprehensive overview of the purposes and function of both 
the Free Press Clause and a free press in a democratic polity more generally, see David A. 
Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983). Professor Anderson 
posits that, for the Framers, “[f]reedom of the press—not freedom of speech—was the primary 
concern.” Id. at 533; see also Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1025, 1032–33, 1043, 1069–70 (2011) (noting “the common intuition that there does exist a 
press that performs a special role in our democracy and is deserving of constitutional status 
outside the shadow of the Speech Clause” and arguing that “[t]he Press Clause needs a distinct 
definition to truly fulfill its unique functions in our society and our democracy”). Of course, if 
one embraces the point of view that the mass media play an integral role in the process of 
democratic deliberation, it might necessarily follow that vesting such power in unregulated 
private hands constitutes a problematic public policy—as opposed to using government power 
to ensure access to the mass media. See JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR 
WHOM?: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS MEDIA (1973); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the 
Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). If the mass media are 
an essential component of the democratic process, like the political parties themselves, one 
could conceive of the press as having constitutional obligations, as do the political parties, 
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incumbent White House administration openly and brazenly embraces the concept 
of “alternative facts.”3 
                                                                                                                 
 
when they undertake an essential role in the electoral process. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 
461, 469–70 (1953). But cf. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254–58 (1974) 
(invalidating on First Amendment grounds a Florida law that required a newspaper to afford  
a candidate for public office a “right of reply” if a newspaper opposed the candidate’s 
election). 
 3. Jim Rutenberg, “Alternative Facts” and the Costs of Trump-Branded Reality, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/business/media/alternative-facts-
trump-brand.html [https://perma.cc/UJE9-BSVL] (discussing the Trump administration’s efforts 
to peddle to the press and body public so-called “alternative facts,” which are verifiably false, 
but self-serving, factual claims). The Trump administration’s routine flouting of government 
ethics rules presents another need for whistleblowing speech to ensure that high government 
offices are not used for personal pecuniary gain—perhaps at the expense of the national inter-
est. See Eric Lipton, White House Moves To Block Ethics Inquiry into Ex-Lobbyists on Payroll, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/us/politics/trump-white-
house-government-ethics-lobbyists.html [https://perma.cc/U8MC-VQ8X]. Other examples of 
the potential abuse of power have come to light only because of internal leaks to the press. 
See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, Ashley Parker & Ed O’Keefe, Trump Angrily Calls Russia 
Investigation a “Witch Hunt,” and Denies Charges of Collusion, WASH. POST (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/deputy-attorney-general-rod-
rosenstein-will-brief-the-full-senate-in-a-closed-session/2017/05/18/41de8548-3bd4-11e7-
8854-21f359183e8c_story.html [https://perma.cc/MW6A-5JAW]; Devlin Barrett & Matt 
Zapotosky, Russia Probe Reaches Current White House Official, People Familiar with the 
Case Say, WASH. POST (May 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/russia-probe-reaches-current-white-house-official-people-familiar-with-the-case-
say/2017/05/19/7685adba-3c99-11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html [https://perma.cc 
/AY7H-BE23]. The Trump administration consistently denies growing reports of both finan-
cial self-dealing with the Russian government and efforts to block or impede investigation of 
its political and financial ties to the Russian government; nevertheless, investigators seem to 
have established that senior leaders in the campaign were on the Russian government’s pay-
roll. Mark Mazzetti & Matthew Rosenburg, Michael Flynn Misled Pentagon About Russia 
Ties, Letter Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/05/22/us/politics/michael-flynn-fifth-amendment-russia-senate.html [https://perma.cc 
/JHG4-28LC]. Even so, however, President Trump himself has admitted, after leaks from 
White House staffers to the national press corps, that he casually shared classified Israeli in-
telligence with senior Russian government officials at an Oval Office meeting. See Adam 
Goldman, Eric Schmitt & Peter Baker, Israel Said To Be Source of Secret Intelligence Trump 
Gave to Russians, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16 
/world/middleeast/israel-trump-classified-intelligence-russia.html [https://perma.cc/RHH4-
8KFK]. To be sure, all presidential administrations seek to suppress damaging information 
that calls into question the administration’s honesty, competence, and discretion. However, 
the scale of malfeasance, and possibly corruption, in the current White House may well rival 
that of the Grant administration, which arguably held the record on these fronts until now. See 
Michael A. Genovese, Presidential Corruption: A Longitudinal Analysis, in CORRUPTION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 135, 140–42 (Michael A. Genovese & Victoria A. Farrar-Myers eds., 
2010) (noting that that the Grant administration was “victimized by widespread political cor-
ruption” that involved the highest levels of government, including the Vice President and sev-
eral members of the cabinet, and positing that Grant’s political inexperience, poor personnel 
choices, lax management style, and tendency to place personal loyalty over competence were 
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Professor David Anderson observes that for James Madison and the other 
proponents of the Bill of Rights, “freedom of the press was inextricably related to 
the new republican form of government and would have to be protected if their vision 
of government by the people was to succeed.”4 The press obviously plays a crucial 
role in facilitating the process of democratic deliberation and government 
accountability.5 But the press can play this role only if journalists are able to obtain 
and disseminate accurate information about the government’s activities.6 
Since time immemorial, however, government officers will race to claim respon-
sibility for successes but are far more reticent to acknowledge—much less take re-
sponsibility for—government failures.7 All of the relevant incentives run toward at-
tempting to hide or cover up instances of corruption, malfeasance, or ineptitude. And, 
yet, democratic accountability requires that information that incumbent government 
officers would prefer to suppress be made available to the voters—who express a 
collective judgment on the success, or failure, of the incumbent officers on election 
day through their ballots.8 
                                                                                                                 
 
the root causes of it); SCOTT JOHN HAMMOND, ROBERT NORTH ROBERTS & VALERIE A. 
SULFARO, CAMPAIGNING FOR PRESIDENT IN AMERICA: 1788–2016, at 526–27 (2016) (observing 
that “Grant led what was far and away the most corrupt administration to date,” discussing 
various scandals that occurred on President Grant’s watch, notably including the infamous 
Crédit Mobilier scandal, and noting that “[b]ecause of the extensive corruption, a new term, 
‘Grantism,’ was coined both to describe the condition of corruption that gripped the admin-
istration and to claim the location of its source directly in the president himself rather than in 
the Republican Party”). Although it is probably too early to draw any firm conclusions, an 
analogy between the Trump administration and the Grant administration with regard to their 
ethical standards may well prove to be apt. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Kenneth P. Vogel, 
Trump Loyalist Mixes Businesses and Access at “Advisory” Firm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/us/politics/corey-lewandowski-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/NSB8-8TAE] (noting the existence of “ethical quandaries surrounding the 
Trump White House, where the president has given significant access and power to friends 
and loyalists who are not on the government payroll but work as lobbyists or retain significant 
outside business interests” and observing that “Mr. Trump’s ‘kitchen cabinet’ includes 
Washington lobbyists, a variety of so-called strategic advisers who provide advice on govern-
ment policy making but are not registered as lobbyists, and a panoply of wealthy friends with 
extensive business interests before the [federal] government”). 
 4. Anderson, supra note 2, at 537. 
 5. Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2434–37 (2014). 
 6. Id. at 2446–47; see West, supra note 2, at 1032–33, 1041–47, 1069–70 (noting the 
need for press access to information in order to facilitate using the electoral process to secure 
government accountability). 
 7. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An 
Essay on the Obama Administration, Google Government, and the Difficulties of Securing 
Effective Governance, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 454, 469 (2011) (observing that “systemic 
failures of governance are not particularly rare, which is a very good reason indeed to spend 
considerable time and energy thinking about issues associated with administrative compe-
tence” and positing that “all presidential administrations, regardless of political party, are 
prone to suppress bad news whenever possible”). 
 8. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
22–27, 36–38 (1948). 
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Government employees are obviously quite often in the best position to know 
about government engaging in questionable, if not entirely illegal or unconstitutional, 
activity. Edward Snowden’s revelations about the existence of a massive domestic 
spying program set off a national debate about the relative importance of national 
security, and anti-terrorism efforts, versus informational privacy.9 Because intelli-
gence agencies invariably operate in largely non-transparent ways, only an insider—
a whistleblower—could credibly confirm the existence of government domestic 
spying programs like PRISM.10 
What’s more, domestic surveillance programs could easily be used in ways that 
thwart or inhibit democratic accountability—for example, by using embarrassing 
personal information to discredit political opponents of the incumbent president.11 
Or by aiding or inhibiting the election of a sitting member of Congress—or even a 
presidential candidate—through selective data dumps.12 Truly, information is 
power—particularly when the information is purloined from smart phones, email 
accounts, and web surfing habits.13 Very few people would want to share with God  
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See Editorial, Edward Snowden, Whistle-Blower, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/opinion/edward-snowden-whistle-blower.html [https:// 
perma.cc/9GSK-YRC5]; see also Siobhan Gorman, Carol E. Lee & Janet Hook, Obama 
Proposes Surveillance-Policy Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/obama-to-unveil-new-plans-for-surveillance-transparency-1376063621 [https:// 
perma.cc/B2MX-LGK6]. 
 10. See Margaret Hu, Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1679, 1686–93 (2015). 
 11. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1952–
58 (2013). 
 12. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. 
ELECTIONS (2017) (reporting on the Russian government’s intentional and sustained activities 
to damage the presidential campaign of Hillary Rodham Clinton and to advance the electoral 
prospects of Donald Trump); see also Eric Lipton, David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, The Perfect 
Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html [https://perma.cc 
/8NFJ-TTC5] (reporting on how the Russian government used sophisticated cyberattacks to 
damage Hillary Rodham Clinton’s credibility and, in the process, enhanced Donald Trump’s 
electoral chances); Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Putin Led a Complex Cyberattack 
Scheme To Aid Trump, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/01/06/us/politics/donald-trump-wall-hack-russia.html [https://perma.cc/S98M-WN74] 
(reporting on the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that Russia’s cyber hacking efforts 
were intended to advance Donald Trump’s candidacy and injure the Clinton campaign’s cred-
ibility with the electorate). 
 13. Joined Cases C-293/12 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for 
Commc’ns, Marine and Nat. Res., 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 238, ¶ 28 (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CJ0293&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= 
[http://perma.cc/DJ5C-8VJB] (observing that “it is not inconceivable that the retention of the 
data in question might have an effect on the use, by subscribers or registered users, of the 
means of communication covered by the directive and, consequently, on their exercise of free-
dom of expression”); see also Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Joined Cases C-
293/12 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine and Nat. Res., 
2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 845, ¶ 52 (Dec. 12, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu 
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and country all of their most intimate communications and online activities.14 
In sum, for elections to secure government accountability, the electorate must 
have the information required to reach sensible conclusions about what government 
is doing well and what government is doing poorly.15 As Professor Alexander 
Meiklejohn stated the proposition, “[w]hen a free man is voting, it is not enough that 
the truth is known by someone else, by some scholar or administrator or legislator.”16 
Instead, “[t]he voters must have it, all of them.”17 
The question then becomes: How precisely will the electorate come to possess the 
information that it requires to make accurate determinations about the current gov-
ernment’s wisdom—or lack of it? It is easy enough to say, “Well, the mass media 
will report on the activities of the government.” But, this only kicks the can down 
the road a bit further—precisely how will the media come to possess the information 
necessary for voters to make wise electoral decisions? 
Quite obviously, government employees will play a regular and important role in 
facilitating the ability of citizens to hold government accountable through the elec-
toral process.18 A government employee who possesses information relevant to gov-
ernment misconduct has a choice to make: She could release the information to the  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CC0293&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= [http://perma.cc/DJ5C-
8VJB] (observing that the European Union’s massive data collection and retention program 
gave rise to “the vague feeling of surveillance” and that such surveillance could be “capable 
of having a decisive influence on the exercise by European citizens of their freedom of ex-
pression and information” and, accordingly, produced an unacceptable chilling effect on the 
exercise of freedom of speech). 
 14. See Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 845, 
¶ 52; see also NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 105–07, 165, 179–80 (2015). Professor Richards observes that “[a]t one level, it 
would seem obvious that surveillance chills and deters free thought, reading, and communica-
tions,” but surveillance also leads people to “change their behavior toward the ordinary and 
the inoffensive” too. See Richards, supra note 11, at 106. In sum, “[w]hen we feel we are being 
watched, we act differently.” Id. 
 15. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 37 (“In the last resort, it is not our representatives 
who govern us. We govern ourselves, using them. And we do so in such ways as our own free 
judgment may decide.”). 
 16. Id. at 88. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Julian W. Kleinbrodt, Note, Pro-whistleblower Reform in the Post-Garcetti Era, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 111, 113 (2013) (arguing that “[w]histleblower speech is critically im-
portant because it helps ensure a well-functioning democracy” and observing that information 
provided by government employees can be crucial to securing accountability); Diane 
Norcross, Comment, Separating the Employee From the Citizen: The Social Science 
Implications of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 40 BALT. L. REV. 543, 570–72 (2011) (noting the value 
of whistleblowing speech to securing government accountability); Julie A. Wenell, Note, 
Garcetti v. Ceballos: Stifling the First Amendment in the Public Workplace, 16 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 623, 635–37 (2007) (noting the importance of government employees engaging 
in whistleblowing speech to securing reform and quoting a Garcetti brief for the proposition 
that “[n]either the public nor the government itself can hold officials accountable for abuse 
unless public employees can disclose government misconduct without fear of reprisals.”). 
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press, in order to facilitate reform and electoral accountability or, in the alternative, 
she could remain silent in order to protect a government office from public embar-
rassment. If we want government employees to facilitate accountability by sharing 
critical information about the government’s activities with the body politic, we 
should consider carefully the incentives—and disincentives—that we provide for 
choosing speech over silence.19 For example, if we wish to encourage strongly public 
disclosure about matters of public concern,20 we would provide very robust legal 
protections against a government employer retaliating against a government em-
ployee who engages in whistleblowing activity.21 Simply put, ambiguity in the scope 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. See Louis Michael Seidman, Powell’s Choice: The Law and Morality of Speech, 
Silence, and Resignation by High Government Officials, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW 48, 78–80 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010). Professor Seidman notes that Garcetti creates per-
verse incentives to ignore the chain of command and creates a doctrinal framework that 
“sharply favors those who are willing to make a clean break.” Id. at 80. This result obtains 
because “the [government] employer has no employment needs when the speaker is no longer 
a government employee.” Id. Accordingly, “the more an employee is willing to break with her 
patron, the greater her protection.” Id. This is undoubtedly true. Even so, however, most em-
ployees seek to retain, rather than shed, their current employment. Cf. id. at 79–81 (offering 
reasons and rationales that would incent a government employee to make a noisy exit). 
 20. The need for encouraging such disclosures should be self-evident. See, e.g., Emily 
Wax-Thibodeaux, VA Removes Sharon Helman, Manager at Center of Phoenix Health-Care 
Scandal, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-
eye/wp/2014/11/24/va-removes-sharon-helman-manager-at-center-of-phoenix-health-care-
scandal [https://perma.cc/LP4S-RE7C]. Employees who engage in whistleblowing activity, 
even using protected internal channels, and in theory under the protection of laws like the 
federal Whistle Blower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101–12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 1201–1222 (2016)), face a serious prospect of retaliation by their government em-
ployers. See Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Whistleblowers Say VA Has Not Changed, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 30, 2015, at A19 [hereinafter Wax-Thibodeaux, VA Has Not Changed] (reporting on 
“widespread reports of retaliation against whistleblowers” within the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, including demotions followed by being “moved into windowless storage rooms, or 
basements,” for their work spaces); see also Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Isolated. Harassed. 
Their Personal Lives Investigated. That’s Life as a VA Whistleblower, Employees Tell 
Congress, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-
eye/wp/2015/04/14/isolated-harassed-their-personal-lives-investigated-thats-life-as-a-va-
whistleblower-employees-tell-congress [https://perma.cc/U5HW-TZQK] (reporting on vari-
ous forms of targeted retaliation against VA whistleblowers, including having “their medical 
backgrounds scrutinized, and even their mental health and personal lives investigated” and 
observing that “those who retaliate against [VA whistleblowers] were rarely if ever punished”) 
[hereinafter Wax-Thibodeaux, Isolated. Harassed.]. 
 21. We should also consider whether threatening whistleblowing government employees 
with treason or espionage charges is fundamentally consistent with our “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
270 (1964). But cf. Wax-Thibodeaux, VA Has Not Changed, supra note 20 (noting that “[t]he 
poor and punishing treatment of whistleblowers inside the Department of Veterans Affairs has 
been described as part of a ‘corrosive culture,’” but observing that more than a year after the 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs “vowed to change” this sorry situation, the promised reforms 
had not yet been implemented). Current First Amendment law routinely taxes the cost of 
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of such protection is a strong incentive for government employees to remain silent. 
A rational government employee will not disseminate information about wrongdoing 
within her department or agency if a not improbable consequence will be the loss of 
her employment.22 Given the importance of accurate information about the govern-
ment’s activities to holding government accountable for its actions, the federal courts 
should deploy the First Amendment as a shield for whistleblowing speech.23 
The First Amendment’s protection of speech integral to the political process could 
logically encompass speech by government employees that relates to matters of pub-
lic concern that relate specifically to the government office in which the employee 
works. Targeted protection for “whistleblowing speech” could be justified in norma-
tive terms because such speech is essential to the proper functioning of the political 
process. The Supreme Court, however, has not provided robust protection for gov-
ernment employees who engage in whistleblowing activities.24 Nor has Congress en-
acted legislation that provides comprehensive and reliable protection to government 
                                                                                                                 
 
speech activity against private citizens, even on facts where a meaningful and cognizable legal 
harm has unquestionably occurred. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458–61 (2011); 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54–56 (1988). Why should the government 
itself be immune from having to incur costs associated with the protection of freedom of ex-
pression? If the grieving family of a dead soldier, killed while on active duty, must submit to 
an outrageous and offensive targeted protest of their dead relative’s funeral and burial services 
because we must “protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle 
public debate,” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 461, then, by parity of logic, the government should have 
to incur costs that it would rather avoid in order to facilitate the process of democratic delib-
eration. Unfortunately, however, contemporary First Amendment law does not routinely re-
quire government itself to shoulder the costs of speech when national security or military af-
fairs are at stake. Collective social costs matter—but so do individual social costs. First 
Amendment theory and doctrine should reflect this basic fact; nevertheless, it currently does 
not. 
 22. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the 
Name of “Efficiency,” 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 17, 25, 51–52, 63 (1996) (noting that both statu-
tory and constitutional protections for government employees who engage in whistleblowing 
speech are weak and convey uncertain protection and, accordingly, “[t]he uncertainty in this 
area means that no government employee, regardless of the significance of the communica-
tion, can be ensured that her speech will be protected”); Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: 
Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 65 (1987) (observing 
that “the government office is expected to tolerate more ‘deviance’ and ‘outspokenness’ than 
the private office and many people already assume that it does so” and, in consequence, “[t]er-
mination from a government job therefore may send a profoundly and disproportionately neg-
ative message to other, potential employers” (emphasis in original)). As Professor Levinson 
explains, “whistleblowers will sometimes be penalized for their speech and speech will be 
chilled because employees will not know in advance whether their disclosures will be pro-
tected.” Levinson, supra, at 20 n.6. And, as Professor Massaro has argued, “[t]he difficult truth 
is that an employee who is willing to say things that rankle an employer, however accurate, 
may also be hard to tolerate.” Massaro, supra, at 64.  
 23. See infra notes 141–64 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Kleinbrodt, supra note 18, at 118–28 (discussing and critiquing the shortcomings 
and limitations associated with the contemporary Connick/Pickering doctrine in the context of 
whistleblowing government employee speech). 
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employees who disclose truthful, but embarrassing, information about significant 
failures in the operation of government programs.25  
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the Supreme Court’s initial 
efforts to protect government employees who speak out about matters of public con-
cern under the Connick/Pickering doctrine.26 Part II then contrasts the approach of 
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, which have declined to extend Connick/Pickering. 
Indeed, although the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have never mustered a majority 
to overrule expressly Connick and Pickering, the Supreme Court’s most recent deci-
sions have narrowed significantly the First Amendment protections afforded to gov-
ernment employees’ speech. 
Part III considers the paradox of the near-absolute protection that the Supreme 
Court has afforded government employees to be free of a spoils system in which 
elected government officials condition government employment on partisan loyalty. 
To be clear, I do not suggest that the Supreme Court has erred in constitutionalizing 
civil service protections through First Amendment precedents that prohibit the use 
of a political patronage system for government employment (at least for non-confi-
dential and non-policymaking positions). The point is more subtle: if the potential 
disruption of a government office is not a sufficient predicate for firing an employee 
based on her partisan identity, the same logic would suggest that government should 
be equally debarred from firing a government employee who speaks out on a matter 
of public concern. 
Part IV proposes the creation of a new First Amendment speech category: namely, 
“whistleblowing” speech. The Connick/Pickering line of precedent does not ade-
quately take into account the value of a government employee’s speech to the process 
of democratic deliberation; whistleblowing speech conveys important benefits on the 
body politic that transcend the government employee’s personal autonomy interests 
in speaking out on matters of public concern. Part V provides a brief summary and 
conclusion of the arguments set forth in this Article. 
Government employees are often uniquely situated to provide voters with infor-
mation essential to holding government accountable.27 First Amendment doctrine, 
under the existing Connick/Pickering doctrine, fails to take this consideration into 
account.28 To be sure, government employees should not be required to relinquish 
their right to speak more generally as citizens regarding matters of public concern as 
a consequence of working for a government employer. At the same time, however, 
whistleblowing speech, an important subset of government employee speech, clearly 
facilitates the process of holding government democratically accountable through the 
electoral process. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. See Kathleen Clark & Nancy J. Moore, Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing 
Lawyers, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1697, 1698–1701 (2015). 
 26. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 
(1968). 
 27. Kleinbrodt, supra note 18, at 113–14; Wenell, supra note 18, at 636–37. 
 28. See infra notes 41–56 and accompanying text. 
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Just as political speech enjoys enhanced First Amendment protection vis á vis 
other kinds of speech, such as commercial speech29 and sexually explicit speech,30 
so too, government employee speech that empowers voters to assess accurately gov-
ernment successes and failures should be specially and specifically protected because 
of its essential nexus with the process of democratic deliberation. In sum, although 
not all government employee speech is whistleblowing speech,31 only government 
employee speakers can engage in whistleblowing speech because they are uniquely 
situated to provide the body politic with the information it must have to ensure gov-
ernment accountability through the democratic process and, accordingly, merits in-
dependent and enhanced First Amendment protection from more generic government 
employee speech. 
I. THE WARREN AND BURGER COURTS’ CONTINGENT PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEES AS CITIZEN-PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC SELF-
GOVERNMENT 
Government employees have never enjoyed strong First Amendment protection 
for their speech activity—whether on the job or off the clock.32 Nothing even re-
motely close to a First Amendment privilege for whistleblowing speech has ever ex-
isted in the governing constitutional precedents. To be sure, the Warren Court did 
take some tepid steps toward affording government employees who speak out about 
matters of public concern some measure of First Amendment protection. In 
Pickering, decided in 1968, the Supreme Court held that government employers 
could not punish employees for exercising their First Amendment rights—at least 
when an employee speaks out on a matter of public concern.33 The Pickering test, 
however, was never particularly robust—it involves a balancing exercise that con-
siders the employee’s interest in speaking out about a matter of public concern and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). But 
cf. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 
(1990) (questioning the rationales offered to justify lower free speech protection for commer-
cial speech over other kinds of speech). 
 30. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). But cf. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of 
Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2001) (questioning the basic rationales offered 
to exclude nude images of children from any First Amendment protection and suggesting that 
this doctrinal approach places unjustifiable burdens on artistic freedom); Andrew Koppelman, 
Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635 (2005) (questioning whether 
the government has any legitimate interest in regulating obscenity because it causes moral 
harms to those who peruse such materials). 
 31. Again, it bears noting that government employees speak out about a wide variety of 
matters of public concern, many—indeed most—examples of government employee speech 
do not involve whistleblowing activity. See infra notes 151–59 and accompanying text. When 
a government employee speaks out about a matter of public concern wholly unrelated to her 
government employment, and which does not facilitate the process of democratic accounta-
bility through elections, the speech would not constitute “whistleblowing speech.” See id. 
 32. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (ob-
serving without irony that a city policeman “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, 
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman”). 
 33. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
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then weighs this private interest against a government employer’s interest in main-
taining a well-functioning workplace.34 
Marvin L. Pickering was a high school teacher in Will County, Illinois.35 He pub-
lished a letter to the editor of the local newspaper criticizing the local school board’s 
handling of efforts to secure public approval of new school taxes.36 Pickering’s letter 
challenged some of the local school board’s claims about existing school district ex-
penses and its financial support for the district’s athletic programs.37 The school dis-
trict promptly fired Pickering after the newspaper published his letter criticizing both 
their management of the district, particularly with respect to athletics programs, and 
the board’s efforts to secure public approval of an increase in local school taxes 
through a public referendum.38 The district did so because it concluded that, in the 
words of the governing state law, his continued employment would be “detrimental 
to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district.”39 The 
Illinois state courts upheld the school district’s discharge of Pickering as an appro-
priate action to rein in an insubordinate school district employee.40 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted review and reversed the Illinois 
Supreme Court.41 Writing for the majority, Justice Thurgood Marshall explained that 
public school employees do not relinquish their ability to speak out as citizens re-
garding matters of public concern.42 He observed that 
[t]o the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion may be read to 
suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the 
First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government Employees, 
2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2117, 2119 (2010) (“Under this framework, a public employee’s speech 
is not entitled to any First Amendment protection unless it is determined, as a threshold matter, 
that the speech involves a matter of public concern, and, even if that requirement is satisfied, 
the speech is protected only if the value of the speech outweighs the government employer’s 
interests in restricting or punishing it.”); see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) 
(discussing the matter of public interest threshold requirement and balancing test for deter-
mining whether government employee speech about a matter of public interest enjoys First 
Amendment protection in light of the managerial imperatives of the government employer). 
 35. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564–66. 
 36. Id. at 575–78 (appendix reprinting Mr. Pickering’s letter to the editor). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 566–67. 
 39. Id. at 564–65 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 40. Id. at 565. 
 41. See id. at 565, 574–75. 
 42. But cf. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (observ-
ing that “[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no consti-
tutional right to be a policeman”). McAuliffe equates the rights of public sector and private 
sector employees; accordingly, a government employee, just like an employee working for a 
private employer in an employment-at-will state, “takes the employment on the terms which 
are offered” and “[t]he servant cannot complain” about those conditions. Id. at 518. Pickering 
constitutes a clear break with McAuliffe’s assumption that government, as an employer, is no 
more obliged to respect constitutional constraints than is a private employer. See Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 568, 571–73. 
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comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation 
of the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that 
has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this 
Court.43 
On the other hand, however, Justice Marshall emphasized that “it cannot be gain-
said that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employ-
ees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of 
the speech of the citizenry in general.”44 Accordingly, “[t]he problem in any case is 
to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in pro-
moting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”45  
From its inception, the Pickering doctrine thus required federal courts to weigh 
the disruption associated with the continued employment of a whistleblower against 
the interest of the employee in exercising her First Amendment rights. At least argu-
ably, an important third interest exists and should have been directly factored into 
the balance—namely, the value of the information that the government employee 
provides to the body politic. Plainly, the value of information provided by govern-
ment employees about the operation of a government office varies—particularly with 
respect to the information’s potential relevance to the ability of voters to enforce 
democratic accountability at the next election.46 Moreover, the value of information 
to voters will often correlate positively with the potential disruption that release of 
the information might cause to the government office about which it relates.47 
Explosive revelations of serious and ongoing wrongdoing will cause more workplace 
disruption than a complaint about the occasional misuse of a government-owned cop-
ier by certain coworkers.48 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 44. Id.; see also Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164–65, 178–80 
(1996) (discussing the “managerial domain” of the government as an employer and steward 
of public resources and also the need to take legitimate managerial goals and objectives into 
consideration when determining the proper scope of First Amendment rights in the context of 
government-created environments, including government employment). 
 45. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 46. See Levinson, supra note 22, at 25, 51–52. As Professor Levinson observes, 
To hold that a government employee’s speech can be proscribed no matter what 
the content of the speech and no matter what the specific employee/employer 
situation, is to cut off public debate on speech that lies at the core of the First 
Amendment—speech which is necessary to democratic self-government. 
Id. at 51. 
 47. See generally Kleinbrodt, supra note 18, at 113–14 (noting that the value of infor-
mation provided by a whistleblowing government employee might not be available through 
other means); Wenell, supra note 18, at 635–37 (noting that engaging in whistleblowing 
speech is likely to lead to retaliation if the information embarrasses a government employer). 
But cf. Massaro, supra note 22, at 40–42 (citing Alexander Meiklejohn and arguing that the 
value of information necessary to facilitate government accountability through the process of 
democratic self-government should, in most cases, overbear the cost associated with disrup-
tion allegedly caused by the whistleblowing speech). 
 48. See Wax-Thibodeaux, Isolated. Harassed., supra note 20 (reporting on pervasive 
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In other words, revelations that do not seriously embarrass the head of a govern-
ment agency are less likely to be deemed “disruptive” than revelations that lead to 
criminal investigations or demands for resignations of principal officers within the 
agency.49 The Pickering test, however, focuses not on the value of the information 
to the community, but rather on the abstract interest of the employee in exercising 
her First Amendment rights as a citizen. I do not suggest that an employee’s interest 
in exercising her First Amendment rights should be deemed irrelevant to the analy-
sis—but I would suggest that the importance of the information and the availability 
of the information (or lack of it) from other sources should also be considered in the 
decisional matrix used to determine if a government employer may constitutionally 
fire an employee who engages in whistleblowing activity. 
To be sure, Justice Marshall did emphasize the importance and value of having 
government employees participate in the process of democratic deliberation.50 In 
the context of a referendum of school district voters to approve or reject new taxes 
to support the school district, “free and open debate is vital to informed deci-
sion-making by the electorate.”51 Moreover, “[t]eachers are, as a class, the 
members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to 
how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent” and “it is 
essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of 
retaliatory dismissal.”52 In this regard, one should bear in mind that Marvin 
Pickering was less a crusading whistleblower than an angry crank; his claims about 
the school district’s policies were poorly informed and, in fact, contained numerous 
factual inaccuracies.53 
This aspect of the Pickering majority opinion hints at the relevance of 
information to the body politic as a relevant consideration in affording a 
government employee who engages in whistleblowing activity protection. 
However, the formal balancing test—which weighs a government employee’s 
autonomy interest in speaking out about a matter of public concern against the  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
forms of retaliation visited on VA hospital employees who reported on shocking failures to 
meet the medical needs of injured veterans in places like Phoenix, Arizona). Despite assur-
ances by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs that this systematic pattern of retaliation against 
whistleblowing employees would be stopped, it continued to occur—and on a widespread 
basis. See id. 
 49. See generally Seidman, supra note 19, at 56–61 (discussing the practical and political 
significance of resignations by government officers to the operation of government agencies 
and observing that resignations can both facilitate and also frustrate public accountability). 
 50. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–75. 
 51. Id. at 571–72. 
 52. Id. at 572. 
 53. See id. at 570–73. The Pickering Court extended the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
“actual malice” standard to government employee speech about a matter of public concern. 
See id. at 574–75; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284–85 (1964) 
(requiring a public official plaintiff to prove that a media defendant published false statements 
of fact with “actual malice,” meaning with actual knowledge of falsity or reckless indifference 
to the truth or falsity of a factual assertion of and concerning the plaintiff, and that this showing 
of actual malice must be supported with “clear and convincing evidence”). 
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disruptions that such action might cause going forward in a government 
workplace—does not take this factor into consideration at all. 
Nevertheless, Pickering prevailed because on the facts at bar his speech related to 
a matter of public concern and did not cause significant workplace disruption.54 
Moreover, he prevailed even though his letter to the editor contained some factual 
errors. Pickering made the errors in good faith, the board could easily have corrected 
the public record, if it wished to do so, and Pickering’s letter, the inaccuracies not-
withstanding, plainly related to a matter of public concern. Critically, however, 
Pickering’s authorship and subsequent publication of the critical letter did not “in 
any way either impede[] the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the 
classroom or . . . interfere[] with the regular operation of the schools generally.”55 
On these facts, the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the interest of the school admin-
istration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate [was] not 
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member 
of the general public.”56 
Subsequent cases involving the free speech rights of government employees de-
cided during the Warren and Burger Court eras generally followed Pickering and 
afforded a government employee who spoke out on a matter of public concern First 
Amendment protection, provided that the employee’s continued presence in the 
government workplace was not unduly disruptive.57 To be sure, in Connick v. 
Myers,58 the Burger Court narrowed Pickering’s scope by requiring that the speech 
at issue relate to a matter of public, rather than private, concern and defining 
“public concern” in relatively narrow terms to exclude internal workplace 
management disputes.59 
Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney working in New Orleans, Louisiana, 
was unhappy with being reassigned within the district attorney’s office.60 After 
learning of her reassignment, she circulated a questionnaire “concerning internal 
office affairs.”61 Her survey asked employees about various office personnel 
policies, including transfers, morale, the lack of a formal grievance committee, 
confidence in office managers, and “whether employees felt pressured to work in 
political campaigns.”62 She was promptly fired because the distribution of her 
survey allegedly caused a “mini-insurrection” within the district attorney’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–75. 
 55. Id. at 572–73. 
 56. Id. at 573. 
 57. See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414–15 (1979); Mt. 
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 
408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972). 
 58. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 59. See id. at 145–48. But cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–55 (2011) (defining a 
“matter of public concern” very broadly to encompass very bizarre claims linking the deaths 
of U.S. military personnel with God’s wrath over a permissive attitude toward sexual minori-
ties in contemporary U.S. society). 
 60. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 141; see also id. at 155–56 (reproducing, as an appendix, the entire office ques-
tionnaire that Myers prepared and circulated on October 7, 1980). 
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office.63 After being discharged, Myers brought a federal lawsuit alleging a 
Pickering violation; she prevailed on this claim in the lower federal courts.64 The 
Supreme Court granted review and reversed.65 
The Connick Court found that most of the questions on the survey, save for 
Question 11 on whether office employees felt pressured to work on political cam-
paigns, related to matters of private, rather than public, concern.66 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Byron White explained that “Pickering, its antecedents, and its 
progeny lead us to conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly character-
ized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us 
to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”67 This result obtained because “[w]hen 
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should 
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the 
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”68 
The Connick majority feared that reading Pickering more broadly would turn 
the First Amendment into a means of seeking routine federal court review of 
“ordinary dismissals from government service which violate no fixed tenure or 
applicable statute or regulation.”69 Routine dismissals of government employees 
wholly unrelated to an employee’s speech about a matter of public concern “are 
not subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the dismissal are alleged to be 
mistaken or unreasonable.”70 
Justice White strongly argued that speech primarily related to internal employ-
ment disputes does not seriously implicate core First Amendment values.71 He ex-
plained that 
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public 
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal 
interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not 
the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel 
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the 
employee’s behavior.72 
Employee speech about a matter of public concern enjoys First Amendment protec-
tion, but speech related to a matter of private concern does not. Connick sets forth  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 141–42. 
 65. Id. at 142, 154. 
 66. Id. at 149. 
 67. Id. at 146. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 146–47. 
 71. See id. at 147 (“Our responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of funda-
mental rights by virtue of working for the government; this does not require a grant of immun-
ity for employee grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work 
for the State.”). 
 72. Id. 
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an open-ended test for determining whether a government employee’s speech 
relates to a matter of public or private concern and the relevant considerations 
include “the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the 
whole record.”73 
Even though the Connick Court read Pickering narrowly and confined its scope 
of protection to speech that implicates interests beyond the immediate workplace 
environment, Connick did not undercut Pickering’s protective force when a 
government employee’s speech squarely related to a matter of public concern. And, 
the Burger Court was relatively generous in construing speech as relating to a 
matter of public concern—including, for example, a Mississippi county constable 
office clerk’s declaration, while at work, following the unsuccessful assassination 
attempt on President Ronald Reagan’s life, “‘If they go for him again, I hope they 
get him.’”74 In fairness to Ms. Ardith McPherson, the office clerk who made the 
off-color remark, the record clearly established that, if considered in context, her 
comments plainly related to the Reagan administration’s efforts to reduce or 
wholly eliminate various public assistance programs—rather than her personal 
support for John Hinckley, Jr.’s effort to murder President Reagan. 75 
It also bears noting that Rankin v. McPherson, decided in 1987, is technically a 
decision from the Rehnquist Court, rather than the Burger Court. However, Rankin 
fits more comfortably with the Warren and Burger Court precedents that permitted 
government employees to invoke the First Amendment to contest allegedly retalia-
tory discharges from government employment.76 By the early 2000s, the Rehnquist 
Court, with a firm conservative majority in place, proceeded to erode the Pickering 
line of cases by creating ever-broader general exceptions to its application.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Id. at 147–48. 
 74. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380 (1987). 
 75. See id. at 381 (“But then after I said that, and then Lawrence said, yeah, he’s cutting 
back medicaid and food stamps. And I said, yeah, welfare and CETA. I said, shoot, if they go 
for him again, I hope they get him.”). 
 76. Compare Connick, 461 U.S. 138 (finding a question related to compelled political 
activity by employees of a district attorney constituted a matter of public concern and 
triggered First Amendment protection), and Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–
75 (1968) (holding that a letter to the editor about a referendum on public school bonds 
constitutes a matter of public concern and triggered First Amendment protection against the 
discharge of the government employee who wrote the letter), with Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410, 419–21 (2006) (acknowledging the importance and value of disclosures by 
government employees, notably including “the importance of promoting the public’s 
interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic 
discussion,” but nevertheless denying First Amendment protection to comments made 
within the scope of a government employee’s work-related duties, even if they relate to a 
matter of public concern), and Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality 
opinion) (acknowledging the potential social value of employee speech but concluding that 
“the government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as 
sovereign” and this authority extends to firing an employee based on a misattributed 
comment that, if actually made, could cause workplace disruption). 
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II. REDUCED PROTECTION FOR GOVERNMENT WORKERS’ SPEECH ACTIVITY UNDER 
THE REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS 
Whatever the limitations and shortcomings of the Connick/Pickering doctrine, 
the Warren and Burger Courts applied the doctrine more generously than did their 
successors. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, although never squarely overruling 
the Connick/Pickering doctrine, moved to strictly cabin its potential scope of 
application. In so doing, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts made an already weak 
framework for protecting government employee speech even less robust. To be 
sure, the Connick/Pickering doctrine affords only a modest degree of protection to 
government employees who speak within the government workplace. The 
doctrine’s most objectionable feature is the “heckler[’s] veto”77 that it embraces.78 
The protection of government employee speech is always contingent on the 
reaction of other employees within the workplace. If a whistleblower’s mere 
presence in the government office produces significant disruption that impedes the 
office’s work, then the government employer may fire the whistleblowing 
employee without violating the First Amendment.79 
Despite the relatively weak protection that the Connick/Pickering doctrine confers 
on government employees, it represented a major improvement from the approach it 
replaced—namely that the government as an employer enjoys the same freedom of 
action to fire a troublesome employee that a private employer would enjoy.80 To state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140–41, 145 (1966) 
(coining the phrase “heckler’s veto,” and arguing that the hostile reaction of an audience to a 
speaker, or heckler’s veto, cannot consistent with the First Amendment serve as an acceptable 
basis for government censorship of speech); see Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social 
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1416–17 (1986) (discussing the concept of the heckler’s 
veto and attributing the concept’s creation to Professor Kalven). 
 78. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 
89–93, 96–105 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (discussing in some detail the concept of “heckler’s 
veto,” which entails using an adverse public reaction as a justification for the government 
silencing an unpopular speaker). The hostility of a government employee’s coworkers, based 
on her speech, clearly constitutes a form of heckler’s veto because the government’s power to 
fire the worker is contingent on the hostile reaction of an audience, in this instance, the 
speaker’s coworkers in the government agency or office. See Papandrea, supra note 34, at 
2165 (“Another problem with the Pickering balancing test as most courts have applied it is 
that it permits adverse public reaction to the expressive activities to be considered on the gov-
ernment’s side of the balance. As a result, it theoretically matters very little what an employee 
says.”). 
 79. See Connick, 463 U.S. at 151–53. 
 80. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (holding that 
the government, in its capacity as an employer, has the same right to retain or discharge an 
employee that a private employer enjoys). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then on the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, explained that 
[t]here are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to sus-
pend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied 
terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment 
on the terms which are offered him. On the same principle the city may impose 
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the matter simply, imperfect protection of government employee speech is preferable 
to no protection of government employee speech; the perfect solution should not be 
the enemy of the merely good. 
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have weakened significantly even the modest 
protection of government employee speech that the Connick/Pickering doctrine con-
veys on government workers. For example, in Waters v. Churchill,81 the Supreme 
Court held that if a government employer fires an employee based on speech mistak-
enly attributed to the employee, Pickering does not provide any basis for contesting 
the discharge.82 Rather than emphasizing the autonomy interests of the speaker and 
the potential value of a government employee’s speech to the process of democratic 
deliberation, Waters emphasizes the importance of the government’s managerial in-
terest in maintaining order within government workplaces.83 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the Waters plurality, observed that 
“practical realities of government employment” require that in “many situations . . . 
the government must be able to restrict its employees’ speech.”84 Moreover, “when 
an employee counsels her co-workers to do their job in a way with which the public 
employer disagrees, her managers may tell her to stop, rather than relying on 
counterspeech.”85 The “practical realities” of supervising government employees 
permit a government employer to fire an employee based on a mistaken belief that 
the employee made either an unprotected statement or a disruptive statement about a 
                                                                                                                 
 
any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control. This condition 
seems to us reasonable, if that be a question open to revision here. 
Id. at 517–18. In other words, a government employee, as an employee, does not possess any 
right to freedom of speech that his employer is not inclined to recognize. See id. But cf. Helen 
Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech 
To Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 49–50 (2009) (arguing that “requiring public 
employees to relinquish their free speech rights as a condition of employment suppresses ex-
pression at a great cost to key First Amendment values in promoting individual autonomy, 
contributing to the marketplace of ideas, and facilitating citizen participation in democratic 
self-governance”). 
 81. 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
 82. See id. at 674–75. 
 83. See id. (conceding that “[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to 
know what ails the agencies for which they work; public debate may gain much from their 
informed opinions,” but nevertheless granting government employers broad authority to fire 
based on mistaken factual assumptions about an employee’s speech because “where the gov-
ernment is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such 
restrictions may well be appropriate”); see also Bruce Bodner, Note, Constitutional Rights—
United States Supreme Court Gives Public Employers Greater Latitude To Curb Public 
Employee Speech—Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994), 68 TEMP. L. REV. 461, 462–
63 (1995) (noting that Waters advanced managerial control principles at the expense of gov-
ernment employees’ First Amendment rights and predicting that “[t]his expansion of manage-
ment rights will discourage critical public employee speech and undermine efforts to improve 
the delivery of public services through the promotion of employee participation and identifi-
cation of inefficient management practices in the workplace”). 
 84. Waters, 511 U.S. at 672. 
 85. Id. 
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matter of public concern.86 This result obtains because “[m]anagement can spend 
only so much of their time on any one employment decision.”87 In sum, managerial 
necessities permit government employers to act in good faith, but mistakenly, based 
on a reasonable belief about an employee engaging in either unprotected or pro-
tected-but-disruptive workplace speech. 
The Supreme Court further curtailed its protection of government employee 
speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos.88 In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos, a deputy district 
attorney working in the L.A. County District Attorney’s Office, was subjected to 
discipline for testifying in open court his belief that a police officer submitted an 
affidavit in support of a request for a search warrant that contained “serious 
misrepresentations.”89 Ceballos did this even though his supervisors had decided 
not to amend or correct the police officer’s affidavit in support of the warrant 
request.90 Following his testimony, Ceballos claimed that he was reassigned and 
subjected to other forms of retaliatory action by his government employer.91 
Writing for the Garcetti majority, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy found that even 
if speech relates to a matter of public concern, a government employee may not 
claim the protection of the First Amendment if the speech falls within the scope of 
the employee’s work-related duties.92 He explained that “[a] government entity has 
broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the 
restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect 
the entity’s operations.”93 Consistent with this view, the Garcetti majority held that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. Id. at 680–81. 
 87. Id. at 680. 
 88. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 89. See id. at 412–13, 420. 
 90. Id. at 414–15. 
 91. Id. at 415–16. 
 92. See id. at 414–18, 421. 
 93. Id. at 418. The Garcetti majority noted that this rule might not apply in the context 
of speech by professors employed at a public college or university. See id. at 425. Justice 
Kennedy explained that “[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are 
not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.” Id. 
Nevertheless, he concluded that “[w]e need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether 
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech 
related to scholarship or teaching.” Id. However, as Justice David H. Souter observed in 
dissent, the majority plainly failed to address this question, and the Supreme Court has not 
yet issued a definitive ruling on this question. See id. at 438–39 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Garcetti rule does not apply to college and university professors at state-
operated institutions of higher learning and expressing the “hope that today’s majority does 
not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges 
and universities”). But cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (“We have long 
recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive 
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities 
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.  That 
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws 
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“when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the em-
ployees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”94 
The Supreme Court subsequently limited the scope of Garcetti in Lane v. 
Franks,95 by finding that testimony offered under subpoena does not automatically 
constitute employment-related speech.96 Instead, a government employee who 
offers sworn testimony in a civil or criminal judicial proceeding usually speaks as  
a “citizen” rather than as an “employee.”97 Moreover, “[t]hat is so even when the 
testimony relates to his public employment or concerns information learned during 
that employment.”98 Accordingly, a public university employee who testified about 
financial irregularities within the university spoke as a citizen, not as an employee, 
about a matter of public concern—and could therefore claim the benefit of 
Pickering.99 But Lane is hardly a broad repudiation of Garcetti—after all, testimony 
in open court is citizen speech only when it is “outside the scope of his ordinary job 
duties.”100  
 Accordingly, a public employee in a district attorney’s office, like Richard 
Ceballos, whose job includes regular court appearances, would still be speaking as a 
government employee, rather than as a citizen, when in court. Lane certainly cabins 
Garcetti, but it still requires employees who speak out about matters that arguably 
fall within the scope of their employment to do so at their own peril.101 Under 
Garcetti, if a government employer fires an employee based on antipathy toward 
comments regarding a matter of public concern, the employee enjoys no First 
Amendment protection if the speech arguably falls within the scope of the em-
ployee’s duties.102 Moreover, under Waters, the same outcome also applies if a gov-
ernment employer disciplines or fires an employee based on the mistaken belief that 
a particular employee made comments about a matter of public concern that come 
within the scope of her employment.103 
Thus, the contemporary Supreme Court has limited quite significantly the consti-
tutional protections available to government employees who wish to call attention to 
misconduct or inefficiency in government operations.104 This, of course, makes it 
less likely that the people best able to inform the public about misconduct in public 
                                                                                                                 
 
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”). 
 94. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 95. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014). 
 96. Id. at 2378–79. 
 97. Id. at 2378 (“Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope 
of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 2379–80. 
 100. Id. at 2378. 
 101. For thoughtful critiques of Garcetti’s shortcomings, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a 
Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 725–27 (2011); Papandrea, supra note 34, at 2118–
20, 2136–39. 
 102. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 103. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
 104. See Papandrea, supra note 34, at 2122 (“Since Pickering, however, the Court has cut 
back dramatically on the free speech rights of public employees, especially with its most recent 
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.”). 
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institutions will come forward. The result will be that government officials’ bad be-
havior will go undiscovered and, in consequence, uncorrected. A better approach 
would link the importance of a government employee’s speech and the scope of the 
First Amendment protection afforded to the speaker.105 Moreover, enhanced First 
Amendment protection for whistleblowing speech would not either imply or require 
any reduced Connick/Pickering protection for government employee speech about a 
matter of public concern that does not constitute whistleblowing speech.106 
III. THE PARADOX OF CONFERRING COMPREHENSIVE FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS RETALIATING AGAINST A 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE BASED ON THE EMPLOYEE’S PARTISAN AFFILIATION 
Professor Robert Post has written lucidly and persuasively about the importance 
of affording government the ability to manage workplaces to ensure that government 
offices function efficiently and achieve their objectives.107 For example, Departments 
of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) are already widely thought to be highly dysfunctional 
places;108 were DMV employees free to engage in speech activity at will, while on 
the job, DMVs would be even less functional.109 The problem, however, is distin-
guishing between legitimate government efforts to manage and supervise govern-
ment offices and illegitimate efforts to use the accident of government employment 
to squelch a government employee’s speech. 
The line is, at best, an ephemeral one. In this regard, Professor Post observes that 
“the allocation of speech to managerial domains is a question of normative charac-
terization.”110 Yet, if federal courts fail to make serious efforts to maintain meaning-
ful boundaries that cabin effectively the scope of this “managerial domain,” govern-
ment employees can be either silenced or coerced into speech that has nothing to do 
with the legitimate managerial imperatives of the government as an employer. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See infra notes 142–58 and accompanying text. 
 106. See infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Post, supra note 44, at 164–65, 171–76. 
 108. See ZOOTOPIA (Walt Disney Pictures 2016) (presenting DMV offices in Zootopia, an 
otherwise paradisiacal urban metropolis populated by peacefully coexisting anthropomorphic 
animals, as being staffed entirely with slow-talking, slow-moving, and slow-acting sloths). 
 109. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 234–40 (1995) (discussing and explaining the “government’s need to manage 
speech within its institutions” and positing that some regulation of employee speech is essen-
tial because it is necessary “in order to achieve the institution’s legitimate objectives”). Post 
argues persuasively that “[m]anagerial authority is controlled by First Amendment rules dif-
ferent from those that control the exercise of the authority used by the state when it acts to 
govern the general public.” Id. at 240. Accordingly, “[w]hen it exercises the authority of man-
agement, the state can constitutionally control speech so as to facilitate the institutional attain-
ment of organizational ends.” Id.; see also id. at 247–55 (discussing and defining the boundary 
that separates managerial authority from more general regulatory authority). 
 110. Post, supra note 44, at 171; see also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and 
Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1788–89 
(1987) (describing and discussing the “managerial domain” of government action that affects 
speech). 
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An additional paradox exists: Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has vigorously 
prohibited punishing government employees based on their partisan affiliations.111 If 
an employee does not hold either a policy-making position or have access to confi-
dential information, a government office may not use either the employee’s partisan 
affiliation—or lack of one—as a basis for discharging her.112 Indeed, since deciding 
Elrod v. Burns,113 the first case in this line of precedents, the Supreme Court consist-
ently has expanded this rule’s scope of application to encompass even the termination 
of a contract with a government agency over a business owner’s partisan affilia-
tion.114 In a kind of mirror-image of Waters v. Churchill, the Supreme Court has held 
that the First Amendment disallows a government agency from firing a government 
employee based on a mistaken appraisal of an employee’s partisan commitments and 
associations.115 
In other words, even if an employee does not actually hold a particular partisan 
commitment or associational link, a government employer that uses partisan affilia-
tion in error has a chilling effect on the ability of government employees to partici-
pate in the political process—a chilling effect116 that violates the First Amendment.117 
As Justice Stephen G. Breyer explains, “[t]he constitutional harm at issue in the or-
dinary case consists in large part of discouraging employees—both the employee 
discharged (or demoted) and his or her colleagues—from engaging in protected ac-
tivities.”118 Moreover, in terms of a potential chilling effect on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights, “[t]he discharge of one [employee] tells the others that they en-
gage in protected activity at their peril.”119 This chilling effect simply does not de-
pend on whether the employer accurately perceives the employee’s partisan beliefs 
and commitments—it is the act of punishing an employee based on her political com-
mitments, whether real or imagined, that produces the chilling effect on the exercise 
of First Amendment rights.120 
Perhaps most significant, the potential disruption that an employee’s partisan af-
filiation might cause to the smooth operation and managerial efforts of a government 
agency are quite irrelevant to the proscription against a government employer retali-
ating against an employee based on her partisan identity. These concerns are included 
in the Supreme Court’s framework—but only in a highly formalized way.121 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355–60, 372–73 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 112. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517–19 (1980). 
 113. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372–73. 
 114. See O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 720–21 (1996). 
 115. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1417–19 (2016). 
 116. For descriptions and thoughtful discussions of the problem of government regulations 
or policies producing a “chilling effect,” see Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First 
Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689–705 (1978); Monica 
Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1481–
85 (2013). 
 117. Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 118. Id. at 1419. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 1418–19. 
 121. The government employer cannot rely on vague claims of potential disruption in the 
workplace, but, instead, must mount a necessity defense that involves demonstrating an oper-
ational need to use a partisan screen for the position; to date, however, the Supreme Court has 
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exclusion of positions that involve policy making or confidential office information 
reflect a balancing of interests that assumes that for such positions, the government’s 
managerial interests will usually overbear the First Amendment interests of an em-
ployee in freedom of speech, association, and assembly.122 
As Justice John Paul Stevens explained in Branti, “the ultimate inquiry is not 
whether the label ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; rather, the 
question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an 
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office in-
volved.”123 In this respect, the Elrod line of cases does take some account of the 
potential for disruption that employing a political opponent of the office’s elected 
supervisor might cause. But, if the position is merely clerical in nature, and does not 
involve either policy-making duties or processing confidential information, the fact 
that the person’s presence in the office is highly disruptive is entirely irrelevant.124  
Thus, as Heffernan explains, as a general matter, “[w]hen an employer demotes 
an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political ac-
tivity that the First Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge that 
unlawful action under the First Amendment.”125 This result obtains because to permit 
a government employer to retaliate against an employee—whether based on real or 
imagined partisan commitments—would “discourag[e] employees—both the em-
ployee discharged (or demoted) and his or her colleagues—from engaging in pro-
tected activities” because “[t]he discharge of one tells the others that they engage in 
protected activity at their peril.”126 Moreover, when an employer acts on a mistaken 
belief in the context of a partisan firing, the First Amendment still confers protection 
because “[t]he upshot is that a discharge or demotion based upon an employer’s be-
lief that the employee has engaged in protected activity can cause the same kind, and 
degree, of constitutional harm whether that belief does or does not rest upon a factual 
mistake.”127 
In other words, the potential chilling effect of partisan discharges justifies a broad 
and almost categorical rule of First Amendment protection. Whatever dysfunction or  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
validated only operational needs based on a policy-making authority and the regular receipt 
and possession of confidential information as sufficient to overcome the employee’s First 
Amendment rights against forced association and coerced speech. Arch T. Allen, III, A Study 
in Separation of Powers: Executive Power in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2049, 2097–98 
(1999); Martin H. Brinkley, Note, Despoiling the Spoils: Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 
69 N.C. L. REV. 719, 720–21 (1991); Christopher V. Fenlon, Note, The Spoils System in 
Check? Public Employees’ Rights to Political Affiliation & the Balkanized Policymaking 
Exception to § 1983 Liability for Wrongful Termination, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2313 n.68 
(2009). Beyond serving these interests, a government employer would be hard pressed to jus-
tify requiring a particular partisan identity, or lack of one, as a condition of government em-
ployment. 
 122. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517–519 (1980). 
 123. Id. at 518. 
 124. See supra note 121. 
 125. Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 126. Id. at 1419. 
 127. Id. 
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disruption results from the employee’s continued presence in the office is a cost that 
the First Amendment requires the government employer to bear. Unlike a Pickering 
case involving a government employee who merely speaks out as a citizen about a 
matter of public concern, the government may not invoke managerial necessities to 
justify sacking a person who wears the wrong partisan label. Yet, it is quite obvious 
that the problem of a chilling effect is identical; whether an employee speaks out on 
a matter of public concern or engages in partisan activity outside the office, other 
employees will get the message that if they wish to retain their employment, they 
should avoid attracting negative attention from their elected boss. 
The juxtaposition of these lines of precedent is puzzling. The First Amendment 
prohibits the operation of government workplaces on a spoils system basis; the 
Supreme Court has held that this kind of retaliatory motive is flatly unconstitutional 
even if the employee’s continued presence proves to be highly disruptive.128 The 
Elrod/Branti doctrine creates a prophylactic rule that treats partisan antipathy as a 
constitutionally impermissible basis for adverse employment decisions. By way of 
contrast, however, the Pickering/Connick doctrine permits employers to use poten-
tially pretextual claims of possible workplace disruption as a basis for firing govern-
ment employees who speak out on matters of public concern.129 
As the next Part explains in some detail, this differential First Amendment pro-
tection of government employees’ partisan identities, on the one hand, and public 
ideological and policy commitments, on the other, is not self-evidently justified. 
These lines of precedent should—but do not—reflect a great degree of alignment 
with respect to the relative importance of government employees’ First Amendment 
rights and the managerial imperatives of public employers. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. See id. at 1417–19; see also Brinkley, supra note 121, at 720 (observing that the 
“Elrod, Branti, and Rutan holdings” effectively “bar officials from conditioning” public em-
ployment on partisan loyalty and thereby “checkmated a weakened, but tenacious, political 
tradition”); Fenlon, supra note 121, at 2297 (noting that “in order to justify a political patron-
age dismissal, the government must demonstrate a significant interest in replacing public em-
ployees with individuals who are politically loyal to their employer” and that under this rule 
“termination of public employees because of their political affiliation [usually] fails under 
heightened scrutiny and violates the First Amendment”). To provide a concrete example, sup-
pose that a non-confidential, non-policy-making employee in a government office, say a clerk 
in a county tax assessor’s office, runs unsuccessfully for the elected county tax assessor’s 
position—but loses in the general election to another candidate for the office, who subse-
quently assumes the office. Under the Elrod/Branti doctrine, her new boss, the person against 
whom she contested the general election, would not be permitted to fire her even if the cam-
paign was highly contentious and bitterly contested, thus rendering the losing candidate’s mere 
presence in the tax assessor’s office highly disruptive. 
 129. See Papandrea, supra note 34, at 2118–20 (discussing the very weak scope of First 
Amendment protection that the Pickering/Connick doctrine conveys on government employ-
ees and arguing that “[e]mployees do not stop being citizens when they are at work; likewise, 
they do not stop being employees when they are not”). Professor Papandrea persuasively ar-
gues that “Pickering’s balancing test, which weighs the value of the employee’s speech against 
the government-employer’s interest in restricting it, fails to limit government control over its 
employee’s speech activities sufficiently.” Id. at 2120. 
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IV. THE NEED TO PROVIDE ENHANCED PROTECTION TO GOVERNMENT WORKERS 
WHO FACILITATE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY BY ENGAGING IN 
WHISTLEBLOWING ACTIVITY 
The Supreme Court’s Elrod line of cases plainly seeks to prevent the government, 
as an employer, from imposing an unconstitutional condition on its employees—
namely, that they refrain from partisan activity that the elected head of the govern-
ment agency dislikes.130 Protecting the right of government workers to avoid coerced 
silence—or coerced partisan activity—is clearly an important, and justifiable, First 
Amendment objective. After all, Justice Robert Jackson famously posited: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
fess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances 
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.131 
Consistent with this approach, the mere accident of a citizen holding a position 
with a government employer should not zero out the application of this constitutional 
verity.132 Accordingly, I do not suggest that cases like Heffernan, Branti, and Elrod 
reach the wrong outcome on the merits—a government employer should not be able 
to demand partisan loyalty as a condition of employment if the position does not 
involve either policy-making functions or regular receipt of confidences. However, 
it does seem exceedingly strange to protect partisan identity in almost absolute terms, 
and generally without much regard for the potential disruption that will be associated 
with a person’s presence in a government workplace, while permitting a “heckler’s 
veto”133 in the context of truthful, non-misleading speech about a matter of public 
concern. Indeed, many public employees probably care much more deeply about par-
ticular public policy issues or ideological commitments than they do about their abil-
ity to wear their party preference on their sleeves.134   
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. See MARTIN & SUSAN J. TOLCHIN, PINSTRIPE PATRONAGE: POLITICAL FAVORITISM 
FROM THE CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND BEYOND 5–6, 24–28 (2011). 
 131. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 132. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
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 133. See KALVEN, supra note 77, at 140–41, 237 n.327 (positing a serious First 
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see also Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous 
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 
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 134. To be sure, if a government employee engages in misconduct or fails to perform her 
duties reliably, alleging that discipline or discharge reflects an impermissible partisan motive 
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In sum, it cannot be gainsaid that the protection of employee speech about matters 
of public concern has waned, rather than expanded, under the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts. Moreover, a strong case can be made that the Warren Court’s initial effort to 
reconcile the managerial imperatives of government employers with the rights of 
government employees to speak as citizens was insufficiently protective in Pickering 
itself. To the extent that an employee speaks out on a matter involving serious 
wrongdoing within her government agency, it is more likely rather than less likely 
that her continued presence will cause disruption in the workplace. 
The Pickering test thus seems to endorse a de facto heckler’s veto: Insubordinate 
agency employees who are disruptive in the presence of a whistleblower should be 
subject to discipline. Firing the employee who calls public attention to serious gov-
ernment wrongdoing or misconduct is to punish the wrong party. Yet, this is precisely 
how the Connick/Pickering analysis works.135 Unruly coworkers who behave badly 
in the wake of whistleblowing activity provide the government employer with a con-
stitutionally acceptable predicate for firing the worker who called problems within 
the government agency to the attention of the body politic.136 In strong contrast with  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
will not necessarily save the employee from an adverse employment action. In such a case, 
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duct) rather than an impermissible one (a partisan purge). See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. 
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1977); see also Massaro, supra note 22, at 17–20, 
68 (discussing the pernicious effects of Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle in 
the context of government employee speech). 
 135. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (applying a balancing test that weighs a 
government employee’s interest in speaking about a matter of public concern against the work-
place disruption that the speech either causes or might cause); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (using potential disruption in the workplace as a permissible basis for 
firing a government employee who speaks out about a matter of public concern); see Randy J. 
Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of Public Employee Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1985, 2019 (2012) (“Through its contemplation of scenarios in which the disruption caused 
by speech provides a lawful basis for discipline, the Pickering test can be understood as con-
stitutionalizing a ‘heckler’s veto’ for controversial expressions.”); Norton, supra note 80, at 
47 (warning that “unexamined deference to government’s fears about onlookers’ reactions to 
workers’ off-duty speech threatens to institutionalize the long-maligned ‘heckler’s veto’”). But 
see Papandrea, supra note 34, at 2156 (noting disagreement in the lower courts regarding 
“whether any actual or expected external disruption resulting from an offended public can play 
a role in the Pickering balancing” and observing that “[s]ome courts have held that only actual 
or potential disruption of internal operations could outweigh an employee’s right to engage in 
otherwise protected expressive activities”). 
 136. See Kozel, supra note 135, at 2019–20; Levinson, supra note 22, at 17–19, 59–61; 
Massaro, supra note 22, at 4, 20–25. Massaro notes that efforts to engage workplace col-
leagues regarding problems in the workplace are particularly perilous because engaging one’s 
coworkers could be deemed intrinsically “disruptive” of the workplace. Id. at 24 (observing 
that “if a worker engages others to join in the chorus he or she may pose a threat, and thus can 
be removed” and, moreover, “that worker can be removed when an employer merely antici-
pates that the chorus might get too large and disruptive”). Massaro correctly concludes that 
the Pickering/Connick framework permits an employer to “prevent a grievance from spreading 
and, as it gains support, from capturing the public’s interest.” Id. 
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the near absolute protection conveyed on a government employee with respect to her 
partisan identity and activity, government employees who speak out about matters 
of public concern risk serious adverse consequences—up to and including potential 
discharge from their government employment. 
On the other hand, however, the Supreme Court has held, repeatedly, that govern-
ment almost never acts legitimately when it seeks to punish an employee because of 
the presence, or absence, of a commitment to a particular political party.137 If an 
employee does not have policy-making responsibilities or access to confidential in-
formation, no matter how potentially disruptive her partisan activities outside the 
workplace, the government employer must simply absorb these costs. The contrast 
with the level of protection for employees who choose to speak about a matter of 
public concern is both dramatic and, it seems to me, inexplicable. 
Simply put, if potential disruption to a government workplace is the evil which 
justifies a government employer in disciplining or discharging an employee, the pre-
cise source of the workplace disruption should be quite irrelevant to the analysis. 
From a Post “managerial necessity” perspective,138 keeping a government office 
functioning should be a sufficient justification either in both cases or in neither case. 
The better course of action, it seems to me, would be to afford broader and more 
robust protection to government employees who speak out about a matter of public 
concern. 
Moreover, to date the federal courts have not taken into account the value of in-
formation to the public when fixing the precise scope of First Amendment protection 
to be afforded a government employee’s speech. Not all government employee 
speech has equal worth in the marketplace of ideas. More specifically, not all gov-
ernment employee speech is integral to facilitating government accountability 
through the electoral process. 
For example, Edward Snowden’s shocking revelations about massive government 
domestic spying programs galvanized a broad-based response—both within the gov-
ernment itself and also within the larger political community.139 Snowden certainly 
exercised his individual autonomy as a speaker by leaking classified information 
about PRISM; but his speech also conveyed particularized knowledge that we should 
care about collectively because it facilitated the citizenry’s ability to hold govern-
ment accountable (or not).140 In some instances, the efficacy of democratic elections 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 130, at 5–6, 24–28. 
 138. POST, supra note 109, at 254–61, 282–90; see Post, supra note 44, at 164–67, 170–75. 
 139. See Gorman, et al., supra note 9. 
 140. See Hu, supra note 10, at 1686–93; Megan Blass, Note, The New Data Marketplace: 
Protecting Personal Data, Electronic Communications, and Individual Privacy in the Age of 
Mass Surveillance Through a Return to a Property-Based Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 
42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 577, 579–82 (2015); Bruce Ackerman, Breach or Debate, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Aug. 1, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/01/breach-or-debate/ [https://perma 
.cc/J4W2-LCAF]. For a comprehensive and thoughtful treatment of the government’s reasons 
for resisting disclosure of national security surveillance programs—and also the reasons why 
transparency about such programs is necessary, see David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: 
Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). 
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to serve as an effective brake on bad government behavior necessarily rests on infor-
mation that only a government employee possesses.141 If we do not effectively pro-
tect government employees who share such information with the body politic, then 
the body politic is far less likely to have access to relevant information about the 
government and its operations. 
Government employee speech that constitutes whistleblowing should be afforded 
broader constitutional protection under the First Amendment than more generic gov-
ernment employee speech that merely relates to a matter of public concern. The 
Supreme Court has given a remarkably broad scope to the concept of a “matter of 
public concern.” Precedents like Snyder v. Phelps142 seem to hold that a matter of 
public concern lies, more or less, in the eye of the beholder.143 
If Westboro Baptist Church’s lunacy144 comprises speech about a matter of 
public concern, then virtually any speech that relates to any question that 
implicates, or could implicate, government policy constitutes speech related to a 
matter of public concern.145 To state the matter bluntly, if the phrase “God Hates 
Fags” is speech about a matter of public concern, then what isn’t? As I have 
observed previously,  
the protean nature of the public concern test in the United States essen-
tially makes the press itself the judge of what constitutes reportage of 
a matter of public concern; courts are highly unlikely to second-guess 
even a marginally plausible claim that speech relates to a matter of 
public concern.146  
As the social cost of protecting speech increases, it becomes correspondingly 
easier to deem the government’s interest in restricting the speech compelling .147 If 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. See Massaro, supra note 22, at 44; Norton, supra note 80, at 21–22, 49–50; 
Kleinbrodt, supra note 18, at 113–14. 
 142. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
 143. Post, supra note 133, at 668–69 (noting that “[a]lthough the ‘public concern’ test rests 
on a clean and superficially attractive rationale, the Court has offered virtually no analysis to 
develop its logic” and positing that, “as matters now stand, the test of ‘public concern’ ‘amounts 
to little more than a message to judges and attorneys that no standards are necessary because they 
will, or should, know a public concern when they see it’” (internal citation omitted)). Post 
explains that because free and open public deliberation is essential to the functioning of 
democratic self-government, “every issue that can potentially agitate the public is also potentially 
relevant to democratic self-governance,” and, accordingly, “[t]he normative conception of public 
concern, insofar as it is used to exclude speech from public discourse, is thus incompatible with 
the very democratic self-governance it seeks to facilitate.” Id. at 670. 
 144. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448–49. Westboro congregants brandished signs bearing slogans 
including “God Hates Fags,” “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” and “Thank God for 
Dead Soldiers.” Id. at 448. 
 145. See id. at 458–61. 
 146. RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., PRIVACY REVISITED: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE 271 n.169 (2016); see also Post, supra note 133, at 678–80 (positing 
that “the criterion of ‘public concern’ lacks internal coherence” and is entirely dependent on “a 
wide array of particular variables inherent in specific communicative contexts”). 
 147. William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on 
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everything is speech about a matter of public concern, then government regulations 
that limit or restrict such speech by government employees will be inevitable. More 
specifically, if virtually all government employee speech could conceivably relate 
to a matter of public concern, then the net amount of workplace disruption that 
such speech could occasion is very high indeed—and potentially crippling to the 
ability of a government office to function. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s 
strong commitment to respecting a First Amendment that disallows content and 
                                                                                                                 
 
Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1640–43, 1646–48 (1996). Professor Van Alstyne 
argues, with some persuasive force, that if one defines speech in very broad and inclusive terms, 
the social costs of accommodating speech will increase correspondingly, rendering it less 
difficult for the government to justify regulating, or even banning, speech activity on government 
property. In the specific context of the Discovery Network decision, he posits that “[i]n ‘leveling 
up’ commercial speech . . . the Court has done less leveling up than leveling down.” Id. at 1648. 
The result is arguably perverse: “For an increasing number of limitations that may make 
reasonable sense in restraining commercial vendors now tend to be sustained even if (and 
sometimes, according to Discovery Network, only if) applied ‘equally’ to political and social 
advocacy uses as well.” Id. (emphasis in original); see Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech 
and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (1988) (arguing that 
low value speech, such as commercial speech, “is not a central theoretical concern of the [F]irst 
[A]mendment” and should be subject to government regulation more readily than core political 
speech). But cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424–28 (1993) 
(holding that Cincinnati could not treat commercial publications less favorably than non-
commercial publications unless commercial periodicals containing nothing but advertising 
contributed in a distinctive way to creating the problem that the city’s regulation sought to 
address). 
  The problem arises because when all speech is deemed equally worthy of First 
Amendment protection, federal courts are not unlikely to level down the level of constitutional 
solicitude that they afford to non-commercial, core political speech. See Van Alstyne, supra, at 
1639–40. This has happened in other areas of constitutional law, such as the right to a jury trial 
in criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . .”). Before the Supreme 
Court held the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial incorporated, via the doctrine of substantive 
due process, against the states, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Sixth 
Amendment required that a person be convicted of criminal charges by the unanimous vote of a 
twelve-person jury. In order to accommodate variations in state criminal procedure regarding a 
petit jury’s size and operation, however, the Supreme Court post-Duncan quickly permitted the 
states to allow convictions based on non-unanimous jury votes, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 
404 (1972), and to use a jury comprised of as few as six members, see Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78 (1970). To be sure, the Supreme Court did disallow a jury comprised of only five 
members. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). Thus, the Supreme Court’s incorporation 
of the right to a jury trial to state criminal proceedings—in theory broadening the scope of 
application of the right—had the perverse effect of watering-down the right to a jury trial in 
federal criminal trials. In sum, as the scope of a right’s application expands, it becomes 
correspondingly easier to justify imposing limits or restrictions on the exercise of that right. See 
Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 
452–56 (1985) (arguing that the federal courts should seek to protect jealously the “central core” 
of the First Amendment to ensure that it functions effectively as a check on the suppression of 
dissent—and dissenters—in times of national crisis).  
296 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:267 
 
viewpoint discrimination148 makes this liberal approach to defining—or, more 
aptly, refusing to define—a matter of public concern quite understandable (indeed, 
even predictable).149 However, the value of information to the public ought to be part 
of the constitutional metric that we use to assess how much disruption government 
must tolerate in order to facilitate government employee speech.150  
For example, we protect partisan identity in nearly absolute terms in order to avoid 
the unconstitutional conditions problem that would arise if we permitted government 
as an employer to cage its employees as citizens.151 But government employees act 
no less as citizens when they contribute to the process of democratic deliberation by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–92 (2011); United States 
v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc. 529 U.S. 803, 811–12, 818 (2000); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 394–95 (1992). As Professor Post explains, the need to maintain the open and free-
flowing debate required to sustain the process of democratic self-governance should lead us to 
be very cautious before excluding “speech from public discourse, particularly if, as a normative 
matter, the content of the speech at issue cannot definitively be excluded as irrelevant to matters 
of self-governance.” Post, supra note 133, at 674. 
 149. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“[A]s a general matter, . . . gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Elena Kagan, 
The Changing Face of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and 
the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 70–71; Martin H. 
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981). 
 150. See Blasi, supra note 147, at 449–52 (arguing that the federal courts should seek to 
protect dissenting speech most aggressively in times of disorder or perceived threat because 
such speech possesses particular importance, or value, in such perilous times). Professor Blasi 
posits that: 
[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first amendment to 
do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox 
ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to 
stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment, in other words, should be tar-
geted for the worst of times. 
Id. at 449–50. Like radically unpopular dissenters in periods of perceived national crisis, gov-
ernment workers who engage in whistleblowing speech risk swift and sure retributive action 
by their employer and coworkers alike; accordingly, the doctrinal standards applied under the 
First Amendment to such speech must be more robust and constrain judicial discretion more 
effectively than the current Pickering/Connick doctrine. See id. at 474 (arguing that “[i]n craft-
ing standards to govern specific areas of first amendment dispute, courts that adopt the patho-
logical perspective should place a premium on confining the range of discretion left to future 
decisionmakers” and that “[c]onstitutional standards that are highly outcome-determinative of 
the cases to which they apply are thus to be preferred”). My proposal to afford whistleblowing 
speech targeted First Amendment protection simply seeks to apply Blasi’s “pathological per-
spective” approach in the context of government employee speech integral to the process of 
democratic self-government. 
 151. See Sullivan, supra note 132, at 1416, 1503–04. Professor Sullivan cautions that the 
Connick/Pickering line “present[s] the obvious danger that courts will find justification for 
requiring public employee silence or conformity too lightly.” Id. at 1504 n.390. She posits that 
government claims of managerial necessity to restrict government employee speech, including 
partisan or ideological speech, “should be treated as infringing speech and thus in need of 
strong justification, but as arguably justified by the need for an efficient or depoliticized bu-
reaucracy.” Id. at 1504. 
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providing information relevant to the function of elections in securing government 
accountability. If we assume, with some good cause, that government entities seek 
to tout good news and suppress bad news, then we need to create sufficient First 
Amendment breathing room for courageous government employees who chose 
speech over silence.152 
First Amendment theory and doctrine should be sufficiently supple to take ac-
count of this important contextual consideration.153 Government employee speech 
certainly implicates the individual autonomy interest of the government employee as 
a citizen and speaker; but government employee speech also has important value to 
its audience when the content relates to official wrongdoing, inefficiency, or miscon-
duct.154 To state the matter simply, whistleblowing speech is not merely a private 
good, but also constitutes a public good, and First Amendment doctrine should reflect 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. Sally Yates, the Acting Attorney General who refused to defend President Donald 
Trump’s anti-Muslim immigration order provides an example of a government employee who 
chose courage—and was summarily dismissed from her position as a result of this choice. See 
Anemona Hartocollis, Sally Yates Tells Harvard Law Students Why She Defied Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/us/sally-yates-trump-travel-
ban-harvard-law.html [https://perma.cc/2A3D-6B5A]; Sarah Posner, Opinion, Sally Yates 
Just Publicly Confirmed Important Facts About the Trump-Russia Story, WASH. POST: THE 
PLUM LINE (May 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/05 
/08/sally-yates-just-publicly-confirmed-important-facts-about-the-trump-russia-story [https:// 
perma.cc/4772-QL3V]. 
 153. The government employee speech doctrine already draws a distinction between 
speech regarding a matter of public concern and other kinds of speech. Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 145–48 (1983). Moreover, the New York Times v. Sullivan line of cases also relies 
on a distinction between speech related to a matter of public concern and other kinds of 
speech—as well as distinctions based on the subject of the speech—namely whether the sub-
ject of the allegedly false speech is a public official, a public figure, or a private figure involved 
in a matter of public concern. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 
IND. L.J. 881, 889–90, 901–02, 901 n.96, 912 n.146 (2013); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755–61 (1985) (discussing how the First Amendment 
limits the scope of defamation law to ensure robust and wide-open public debate about public 
officials, public figures, and matters of public concern). 
 154. Tiffany Smiley, Opinion, Our Postwar Trauma at the VA, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/make-the-va-great-again-1482882642 [https://perma.cc 
/QR3B-QT5U] (discussing the inefficiencies and pathologies associated with obtaining med-
ical services through the Department of Veterans Affairs and asking “[i]n a world where 
technology is making almost all aspects of life easier, why isn’t there a website, a liaison, or 
an advocate” to assist veterans seeking medical benefits for service-related injuries). The 
myriad dysfunctions that currently plague the Department of Veterans Affairs medical care 
system are known only because VA employees had the courage to speak out—and many have 
suffered direct forms of retaliation as a result. See Tori Richards, Whistleblowers Claim 
Retaliation for Revealing VA Horrors, NBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2017, 4:01 EST), http://www 
.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/whistleblowers-claim-retaliation-revealing-va-horrors-n707996 
[https://perma.cc/F4M7-PQUU] (reporting on the failure of the VA to provide timely treatment 
to veterans at multiple facilities and on targeted retaliation against VA employees who 
disclosed the agency’s systematic failures to provide care to veterans entitled to receive it). 
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this fact; we should encourage civic courage in such circumstances by effectively 
protecting it against targeted forms of retaliation.155 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should adopt a kind of modified Hand formula156 
to govern the analysis of whistleblowing speech by a government employee. Speech 
that facilitates securing government accountability through the electoral process has 
social value not merely because of the speaker’s autonomy interest in speaking, but 
also because of the importance of the information to the electoral process and the 
associated democratic deliberation that informs it. It would not require much of an 
extension of existing doctrine to carve out a separate category of employee speech, 
namely “whistleblowing speech,” that would be eligible for more robust protection 
under the First Amendment than more generic government employee speech related 
to a matter of public concern. 
One might object that the protection of whistleblowers is a matter for Congress 
and state legislatures to consider and decide. It is certainly true that the federal gov-
ernment and most state governments afford statutory protection to at least some 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. See Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The 
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 692–96 (1988) 
(arguing that First Amendment theory and doctrine presuppose the necessity of individual 
citizens taking risks, thereby displaying “civic courage,” in order to ensure that the process of 
democratic self-government functions effectively). 
 156. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). Dennis sustained convictions un-
der the Smith Act based on membership in the Communist Party. To be sure, Chief Justice 
Fred M. Vinson’s majority opinion in Dennis is generally reviled because it permits govern-
ment to criminalize political beliefs in the absence of any concrete criminal behavior based on 
those beliefs. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
YALE L.J. 877, 877, 911–13 (1963); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern 
First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 752–55 
(1975); Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment 
on the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11 (1965). On the other hand, 
however, the Hand formula does have its fans. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an 
Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986). I cite Dennis not to endorse the 
decision’s outcome or precise reasoning, but instead to illustrate that a cost/benefit analysis 
that balances the social value of speech is feasible. Vinson wrote that: 
Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, interpreted the phrase 
as follows: “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary 
to avoid the danger.” 183 F. 2d at 212. We adopt this statement of the rule. As 
articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any other we 
might devise at this time. It takes into consideration those factors which we deem 
relevant, and relates their significances. More we cannot expect from words. 
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (alterations in original); see also United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 
201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). In the context of whistleblowing speech, 
a reviewing court would consider the gravity of the wrongdoing exposed by the government 
employee’s whistleblowing speech discounted by the probability of it being reported or dis-
covered by another source. To the extent that the government employee’s speech was the only 
means of exposing the alleged wrongdoing, it should receive greater protection than identical 
speech that probably would not have come to light absent the whistleblowing speech. 
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forms of whistleblowing activity by government employees.157 But these statutes 
often contain serious gaps and omissions.158 More often than not, an employee who 
engages in whistleblowing speech will quickly find herself standing in the unem-
ployment line.159 If I am correct to posit that whistleblowing speech has a particular-
ized and identifiable social value, because of its ability to facilitate government ac-
countability through the democratic process, then the scope of its protection should 
not be solely a matter of legislative grace. 
In fact, the same potential objection could be leveled at the Supreme Court’s use 
of the First Amendment to constitutionalize civil service protections and, in so doing, 
protect government employees from retaliation for partisan activity (or the lack of 
it). The existence of the Hatch Act,160 and similar state laws, did not prevent or deter 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101–12, 103 Stat. 16 (codi-
fied at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1222 (2016)); Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate 
Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 
79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1087–120 (2004) (providing a comprehensive compendium of state 
whistleblower protection laws and describing their scope of application); id. at 1121–23 (list-
ing and summarizing federal whistleblower protection laws); Robert G. Vaughn, State 
Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 
589–91, 597–601 (1999). A wide variety of federal and state laws confer highly targeted and 
limited protection on whistleblowers; variations in such laws include “the standard for disclo-
sure, whether internal disclosure is required, whether disclosures for violation of federal laws 
are protected, and the entities to which disclosures may be made.” Robert G. Vaughn, 
America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1, 68 (2005); see id. (“A variety of state laws protect whistleblowers. The character and 
content of these laws vary.”). 
 158. Professor Cherry observes that most states do not provide comprehensive protection 
for whistleblowers—regardless of whether an employee works for the government or for a 
private employer. Cherry, supra note 157, at 1045–46. Moreover, she also cautions that “the 
current federal regulatory approach is piecemeal.” Id. at 1121. 
 159. Both federal and state statutory protections for whistleblowing inevitably protect only 
employees who rely on internal reporting procedures, rather than releasing information about 
wrongdoing to the press or other outside parties. See Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis 
of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting 
Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1633, 1638–39 (2008) (noting that “[m]ost state whis-
tleblower statutes restrict the parties to whom a whistleblower may report in order to receive 
protection from retaliation” and that the main federal law, the Whistleblower Protection Act 
of 1989, does not protect employees who make external disclosures either). Accordingly, “[i]f 
an employee blows the whistle on a specific type of violation, then that employee is protected 
from retaliation by federal law,” but, on the other hand, noting that such “piecemeal,” incom-
plete protection quite often leaves an employee with “no remedy whatsoever.” Cherry, supra 
note 157, at 1121; see Sinzdak, supra, at 1633–34 (noting that virtually no whistleblower pro-
tection laws convey protection on employees who “choose to report to the media or other non-
governmental third parties”). 
 160. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7321–326 (West 2007 & Supp. 2017). The first federal effort to cabin 
the practice of using federal jobs to animate a partisan spoils system was the Civil Service Act. 
See Civil Service Act, ch. 27, §2, 22 Stat. 403, 403–04 (1883). The Supreme Court has gener-
ally sustained civil service laws that proscribe partisan political activity by government em-
ployees. See United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95–103 (1947). In 
Mitchell, Justice Stanley Reed explained that “[t]o declare that the present supposed evils of 
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the Justices from applying the First Amendment vigorously to protect government 
employees from being compelled to engage—or to refrain from engaging—in parti-
san activity.161 
In fact, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.’s Elrod opinion relies directly on the 
existence of civil service protections to support the conclusion that the First 
Amendment generally disallows the creation and maintenance of a partisan spoils 
system.162 Rather than giving preemptive effect to federal and state civil service laws, 
the Elrod Court cited the existence of such laws to help establish the illegitimacy of 
patronage systems.163 Under the same analytical logic, the existence of laws 
conveying limited protection on whistleblowers should support, rather than 
undermine, the creation of a constitutional privilege, grounded in the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, that shields whistleblowers from retaliation by 
their public employers. 
Provided that speech occurs outside the workplace (as Pickering’s did), there is 
little that separates partisan activity/speech and citizen speech related to democratic 
accountability. If anything, speech that facilitates democratic accountability is more 
important to the process of democratic self-government than partisan activity or 
speech by government employees. Non-government employees can engage in parti-
san activity; it is not essential to have government employees engaged as partisan 
agents for political parties to function—but it is arguably necessary to remove poli-
tics from the operation of the civil service in order for it to function.164 By way of 
contrast, voters have to have information that only government employees can pro-
vide. If elections are to function as an effective means of securing democratic ac-
countability from the government, then the electorate must have accurate, truthful 
information about areas in which the government’s efforts are falling short of the 
relevant mark.165 
                                                                                                                 
 
political activity are beyond the power of Congress to redress would leave the nation impotent 
to deal with what many sincere men believe is a material threat to the democratic system.” Id. 
at 99. 
 161. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 379–80 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
maintaining the health and vibrancy of the political parties is a sufficient justification for a 
patronage system for government employment, noting the existence of federal and state civil 
service protections, but observing that “the course of such reform is of limited relevance to the 
task of constitutional adjudication in this case”). 
 162. See id. at 370–73. 
 163. Id. at 371–73; cf. id. at 386–87 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the existence of 
statutory civil service protection against patronage-based hiring decisions adequately protects 
the First Amendment rights of government employees and objecting that the majority’s “ad 
hoc judicial judgment runs counter to the judgments of the representatives of the people in 
state and local governments, representatives who have chosen, in most instances, to retain 
some patronage practices in combination with a merit-oriented civil service”). 
 164. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 
556, 564–67 (1973); Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 95–103. 
 165. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 25–27, 36–38, 70, 88–89. 
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CONCLUSION 
Existing First Amendment theory and practice underprotects government em-
ployee speech in general and grossly underprotects whistleblowing speech by gov-
ernment employees. The Connick/Pickering doctrine leaves government employee 
speech’s protection largely, if not entirely, in the hands of their coworkers and su-
pervisors. If a government employee engages in highly unpopular speech, the 
Connick/Pickering doctrine authorizes government workplace managers to invoke a 
heckler’s veto as a basis for dismissing the troublesome employee—even though, 
viewed from a different vantage point, the insubordination of the speaker’s cowork-
ers might present a better (stronger) case for discipline. Given that the First 
Amendment, as a general matter, prohibits viewpoint discrimination,166 it is 
unfortunate that government employee speech is essentially subject to viewpoint-
based regulation in the guise of a balancing test. Government employees, as citizen-
speakers, merit more robust protection for their autonomy as speakers. 
Of course, some protection as a citizen-speaker is better than no protection. The 
Warren and Burger Courts deployed the First Amendment to convey modest protec-
tion on government employee speech under a test that favors the government as a 
manager over the government employee as a speaker and citizen. Whatever the short-
comings of the Connick/Pickering test prior to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, the 
most recent decisions on the speech rights of government employees have exacer-
bated, rather than reduced, them. Allowing a government employer to fire an em-
ployee based on misattributed speech—or even speech that did not happen—hardly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principal underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96–98 (1972) (holding invalid a viewpoint-based regulation of speech and 
explaining that viewpoint-based regulations of speech are presumptively inconsistent with the 
First Amendment); see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 12–
13, 169 (1995) (noting that viewpoint-based regulations of speech are particularly objectionable 
because they represent efforts by government to tilt the marketplace of ideas in one direction, 
thereby foreclosing the normal operation of democratic politics, and arguing that “[w]hen 
government regulates on the basis of viewpoint, it will frequently be acting for objectionable 
reasons”). Justice Thurgood Marshall explained the rule against viewpoint discrimination in 
these terms: 
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First 
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose 
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or 
more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing 
or debating in public facilities. There is an “equality of status in the field of ideas,” 
and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. 
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government 
may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they 
intend to say. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (internal citation omitted); see Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 57 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment's 
prohibition against government discrimination among viewpoints on particular issues falling 
within the realm of protected speech has been noted extensively in the opinions of this Court.”). 
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protects the government employee as a citizen-speaker.167 Nor does denying protec-
tion to government workers who speak on a matter of public concern within the con-
text of their employment duties.168 The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts took an already 
weak doctrinal framework for protecting government employee speech and rendered 
it even less protective.169 Thus, in this important context, First Amendment rights 
have contracted, rather than expanded, over time.170 
To be sure, some government employee speech contributes little, perhaps nothing, 
to the process of democratic deliberation. Nevertheless, it should be protected be-
cause government employees do not lose their status as citizens and voters simply 
because they work for the state. Like other citizens who do not hold government 
employment, government employees have a right to participate in the process of 
democratic deliberation; this autonomy interest certainly merits First Amendment 
protection. However, a subset of government employee speech, whistleblowing 
speech, possesses an essential nexus to the electoral process’s core function of hold-
ing government accountable to the electorate for its actions. The failure of the federal 
courts to take into account this critically important informational value of whistle-
blowing speech constitutes a major failure of judicial vision (if not judicial courage). 
In sum, the Supreme Court has failed to recognize and incorporate an important 
First Amendment value in the context of government employee speech: the clear 
relationship of government employee speech to holding government accountable 
through the democratic process. In many circumstances, relevant information about 
government misconduct will be known only by government employees. 
Accordingly, if government employees do not speak, the information simply will not 
come to the attention of the electorate, and government accountability to the people 
will be impeded as a result. If one of the principal animating purposes of the First 
Amendment is to facilitate the process of democratic deliberation,171 precisely to fa-
cilitate the ability of ordinary citizens to enforce government accountability, then 
stronger medicine is clearly needed.172 First Amendment theory and doctrine can and 
should take account of these values by conveying targeted and robust protection to 
whistleblowing speech by government employees. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 680–81 (1994). 
 168. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). If applied literally, the Garcetti rule 
would essentially eliminate any protection for college and university professors because their 
employment encompasses their teaching and writing. Garcetti notes, but does not decide, the 
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government employee speakers under the Roberts Court). 
 170. See Papandrea, supra note 34, at 2122 (observing that the Rehnquist and Roberts 
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 171. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 22–27, 36–41, 88–89, 91. 
 172. Id. at 25–27. Professor Meiklejohn argued forcefully that “public intelligence” is re-
quired for democratic self-government to function, see id. at 70, in addition to the citizenry 
possessing the information necessary to reach sound collective judgments about the govern-
ment on election day. See id. at 88. 
